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 Abstract 
 
This study uses cross-section and panel data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey to 
explore contextual influences on the relationship between performance-related pay (PRP) and 
organizational performance.  While it finds strong evidence that the use of PRP can enhance 
performance outcomes, it also determines that this relationship is qualified by the structure of 
workplace monitoring environments.  In addition, it presents evidence that managers learn about 
optimum combinations of pay system and monitoring environment through a process of 
experimentation.  Lastly, although there exists a robust positive association in these data between use 
of PRP and pay inequality, it appears that these higher levels of inequality carry no performance 
penalty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, performance-related pay (PRP) has become a standard element of the 
management toolkit for achieving competitiveness.  However, despite this apparent 
popularity among business practitioners, the evidence is weak for the blanket superiority of 
compensation systems that incorporate elements of PRP over their “traditional” time-based 
counterparts.  Indeed, what is striking about the literature on PRP is the degree of variation in 
its results, as studies in differing sectoral and organizational contexts offer a remarkable 
variety of assessments of the relative effectiveness of PRP systems (Lazear 2000; Marsden et 
al. 2001; Levine 1991; Pfeffer and Langton 1993).  In this paper we build on this observation, 
integrating it with a reading of the theory of the “New Economics of Personnel” (NEP) that 
focuses on the role of workplace context—which we label “monitoring environment”—as a 
critical determinant of the performance effect achieved by PRP systems.  In doing so, we 
present evidence that there exists an interaction effect between pay system and monitoring 
environment which exerts a significant influence upon a workplace’s economic performance.  
Further, we introduce a dynamic element into our analysis in order to test the idea that 
managers must engage in a process of experimentation if they are to find the optimum 
combination of pay system and monitoring environment for their establishment.  The results 
we obtain are consistent with this hypothesis.  In our conclusion, we review the implications 
of our findings for both researchers and managers. 
In addition to exploring the influence of PRP on economic performance, we consider 
its impact on and interaction with the issue of pay inequality.  One account of the growth in 
the last two decades of pay inequality in the UK highlights the role of the contemporaneous 
legislative remaking of the UK labour market (Metcalf, 1995; Howell 1999; Katz and 
Darbishire 2000).  This process, at least partly inspired by the need to boost national 
competitiveness, brought in its wake a notable trend towards greater institutional diversity at 
the level of the workplace, which manifested itself perhaps most clearly in the matter of pay.  
On the one hand, therefore, such umbrella institutions as the wages councils and collective 
bargaining, which had previously helped to generate uniformity in pay outcomes, fell into 
decline or were disbanded; and on the other the use of individual-centred pay mechanisms 
such as PRP, associated with increased pay inequality, expanded rapidly.  While some assert 
that there exists a trade-off between efficiency and equity, with higher inequality being 
associated with higher performance through the greater incentives offered by PRP-like 
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mechanisms (Metcalf 1995), rival theoretical constructs suggest that the opposite might be 
true (Akerlof and Yellen 1990).  Thus, we look for evidence first that PRP is accompanied by 
higher inequality, and second that this raised inequality is compatible with comparatively 
higher organizational performance. 
Our data sets are drawn from the cross section and panel elements of the 1998 (and 
1990) Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS).  This survey constitutes a 
particularly rich source of information about workplace pay systems and practices, in 
addition to offering the necessary institutional and structural variables for our tests.  It is the 
depth of the data that permits us adequately to delineate the monitoring environments of 
workplaces.  Further, the survey’s complex sample design, which aims to replicate the 
structure of that section of the UK economy comprised of workplaces of ten employees or 
larger, enables us to investigate the effects of PRP in a wide variety of industrial contexts.  
Unlike many other studies of PRP, therefore, we may plausibly test the extent to which NEP 
theory is relevant outside the world of Fordist production. 
The paper is structured as follows.  We begin with a review of the implications of 
NEP theory, from which we generate our hypotheses.  Next is an overview of empirical 
developments in the UK labour market that are relevant to the study of PRP, which is 
accompanied by summary results from WERS 98 data.  Having defined the context of our 
study, we elaborate upon the core concept of “monitoring environment” and its interaction 
with pay systems (which, we hypothesize, will result in a “matched” or “mismatched” 
outcome).  A description of our generic model, which incorporates this concept, follows.  Our 
analysis of WERS data comprises two stages:  first, the application of the model to 1998 
cross-sectiona l data, in which we test for the effect of the interaction of pay systems and 
monitoring environments upon workplace performance; and second, an examination using 
1990-1998 panel data of the patterns of diffusion of PRP, which seeks to uncover evidence of 
organizational learning regarding the optimum combination of pay system and monitoring 
environment.  We conclude with a discussion of our various results. 
 
 
2. Theory:  Incentives, Performance, and Inequality 
 
As Prendergast (1999:  7) notes, incentives are provided to workers through the compensation 
practices of their employers.  The manner in which workers then respond to these incentives 
plays a significant role in determining both their individual level of performance and the 
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performance of the organization as a whole.  Within the NEP framework, one of the key 
decisions that managers must make about their compensation systems is whether to use 
“fixed or variable pay”, that is, input- or output-based (performance-based) pay (Lazear 
1995).1  The salience of this managerial decision derives from the expectation that neither 
one of these pay types produces universally superior results (Pfeffer and Langton 1993).  
Thus, in some contexts input-based pay will elicit better results, whereas in others PRP will 
be the optimum choice. 
The principal factor that affects the choice of input- or performance-based pay is that 
of measurement costs.  NEP theory asserts that, given perfect knowledge of a worker’s 
performance, PRP will produce better results for the firm because it creates an explicit 
connection between individual and organizational interests:  by maximizing his or her own 
“take”, the worker also optimises the firm’s position.  However, it is often difficult for 
managers to determine an individual worker’s contribution to the overall performance of an 
organization.  Without this information, managers will not be able to match reward to 
performance with any degree of accuracy, with the knock-on effect that workers will not be 
able to count on a fair reward for effort expended.  Where these uncertainties exist, managers, 
for their part, risk overpaying workers for their contribution, and workers, for theirs, are 
likely to withdraw the effort for which they cannot be sure of compensation.  In such a 
situation, NEP theory predicts that firms would be better off paying on the basis of input 
(e.g., time), even though it is less strongly correlated with organizational performance than is 
worker performance, as it can usually be measured much more cheaply and accurately.  At 
the margin, therefore, input-based pay is the superior type where managers and workers face 
significant uncertainty in the measurement of worker performance. 
These implications of the NEP theoretical framework lead us to focus on the issues of 
worker performance measurement and its associated facility or difficulty as important 
intermediating variables in the relationship between pay systems and organizational 
performance.  We describe this bundle of variables as the “monitoring environment” of a 
workplace.  Although we conceive of monitoring environments as multi-dimensional and 
gradational phenomena, we argue that they may be categorized according to a binary 
typology.  This follows from our assertion that they affect organizational performance only in 
interaction with compensation systems, which are themselves defined in binary terms:  input-
                                                 
1 As the term “output-based pay” carries strong connotations of industrial production, we prefer to use the 
sector-neutral rubric of “performance-based pay” (PRP).  In doing so, however, we sacrifice no conceptual 
accuracy, as this alternative label captures the core concept of the original term, that is, payment according to 
the ex post measurement of value added by a worker. 
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based or worker performance-based.2  Thus, we may imagine a “tipping point” in the 
multidimensional space described by the bundle of variables that comprise the concept of 
“monitoring environment”, to the one side of which lie monitoring environments that 
optimise organizational performance in combination with input-based pay, and to the other 
those that deliver superior results when paired with PRP.  We present this idea in visual terms 
in Figure 1. 
While the above reasoning does not explicitly address the issue of pay inequality, it is 
implicit in the discussion of input- and performance-based pay systems.  NEP theory suggests 
that performance-based pay systems will be associated with higher levels of inequality than 
their input-based equivalents (Lazear 1995) on the grounds that there is greater underlying 
variation in the individual endowments that determine worker performance (e.g., cognitive or 
physical ability, risk propensity, determination, etc.) than in those that determine input (e.g., 
ability to put in eight hours per day, etc.).  However, by increasing the level of intra-
workplace pay inequality found in a workplace, performance-based pay systems run the risk 
of reducing the positive impact on performance of their incentive effect.  This possibility is 
raised by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) in their discussion of the implications of equity theory 
for organizational performance. These authors advance a “fair wage-effort hypothesis”, in 
which they posit that workers’ effort is related to the perceived “fairness” of their pay, or, 
more precisely, that workers will withdraw effort to the extent that they consider their pay 
unfair.  The benchmark of “fairness” that they propose is a weighted average of the pay of the 
workers’ peers within the organization (i.e., those who do similar work, or work of similar 
status) and of the market rate for their own job.  Such an effect is likely to be of particular 
importance in production systems that emphasize teamwork and collaboration among 
workers to achieve shared goals.  Alternatively, workers may conceive of fairness in terms of 
the accuracy with which performance is mapped onto reward, and may withdraw effort in the 
event that management fails to reward good performance appropriately.  Indeed, there is 
evidence to suggest that this effect is a real hazard faced by managers who implement PRP 
systems in an organization, with the costs of errors in performance measurement rising in 
relation to the gearing of the pay incentive (Marsden and Richardson 1992; Marsden et al. 
2001).  Observers who emphasize the performance effects of norms of fairness, therefore, 
                                                 
2 We define a compensation system with any element of performance-based pay as “performance-based”.  
Though we recognize that such systems might equally be described as a mix of input- and performance-linked 
pay, for the purpose of this paper we focus on the categorical distinction between compensation plans that 
provide some variety of performance-related incentive and those that do not. 
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contradict the predictions of NEP theory, asserting that performance outcomes tend to be 
negatively related to pay inequality. 
It is possible to marry the ostensibly contradictory viewpoints of NEP and equity 
theory by asserting that both describe real phenomena, but that these are antagonistic rather 
than complementary.  Thus, PRP may positively influence organizational performance 
through its incentive effect (if it is implemented in an amenable monitoring environment), but 
its by-product, increased pay inequality, may simultaneously modulate performance by 
means of its countervailing disincentive effect.  This paper addresses the question of which 
influence is dominant (if either), and in what contexts that dominance obtains. 
 
 
3. Observed Developments in the UK 
 
In the heyday of British manufacturing, PRP was, in the form of piece rates, a commonplace 
method of structuring workers’ compensation.  However, with the relative decline of that 
sector’s weight in the economy, and with the introduction of production systems in which 
output was measured in terms of collective rather than individual endeavour, piece rate-based 
pay systems became less widely used.  While this process was a long-term one, lasting a 
number of decades, we can see something of it in NES data for the 1980s and 1990s, which 
appear in particular to capture the effect of the accelerated contraction of the manufacturing 
sector following the recession of the early-1980s (Figures 2 & 3).  These data series are 
imperfect for our purposes in that the NES definition of “payment by results” (PBR) includes 
not only what we call PRP (that is, pay linked directly to worker performance), but also pay 
linked to group or organizational performance, e.g., profit sharing.  Nevertheless, the data 
broadly support the story outlined above, showing a steep drop both in the percentage of 
manual workers receiving PBR and in the share of PBR in average gross earnings among 
manual workers.3  Interestingly, though there appears to have been a decline in the use of 
PRP in the shrinking manufacturing sector, over the same period the presence of PBR in the 
rapidly expanding service sector is steady or even grows along both recorded dimensions, 
implying that PRP is not in fact on the verge of extinction.  On the contrary, its continued 
                                                 
3 We take the distinction between manual and nonmanual workers as a rough proxy for that between the “old-
style” PRP of the piece rate variety and the “new style” PRP of the negotiated target variety that now 
predominates in the service sector.  See section 4 for further discussion of this typology. 
6 
relevance in what is by far the largest part of the economy indicates that its effect on labour 
market behaviour is worthy of close scrutiny. 
 The idea that PRP is widespread and influential in its effect is supported by the results 
of the Institute of Personnel Development’s (IPD) 1999 survey of performance pay trends in 
the UK.  This large-scale study reports “deep and rapid growth” (IPD 1999:  2) in the use of 
various types of PBR during the previous fifteen years, with the most popular systems being 
profit sharing and PRP (Table 1).  The discrepancy between the figures presented in Table 1 
and those derived from NES data can be at least partially explained by the time lag between 
the two data sets, their differing definitions of the pay systems in question, and the bias of the 
IPD sample towards larger organizations.  Also, given the comparatively low weight of 
management employees in the workforce, it more accurate to compare the NES data with the 
IPD results for non-managerial employees.  In any case, the report presents evidence that the 
rate of uptake of PRP in the period 1990-1999 far exceeded the rate of discontinuation of 
such pay systems (IPD 1999:  6).  Not only does it appear that PRP is widely used by 
organizations, but also that where it exists the inclusion of almost all the organization’s 
employees is the norm.  Furthermore, the amounts of money involved in PRP rewards, while 
not vast, are typically “not insignificant to the employee concerned” (IPD 1999:  7). 
 The above material, therefore, indicates that PRP is a prominent feature of the 
employment relationship in the contemporary UK labour market.  However, the evidence for 
its effectiveness in drawing superior performance from employees is less clear-cut, with 
differing studies reaching rival conclusions on the matter.  A number of studies using private-
sector samples (Metcalf 1995; Fernie and Metcalf 1995; Heywood et al. 1997) have pointed 
to the existence of a significant positive association between the use of PRP and workplace 
productivity or financial performance outcomes.  Some observers, though, are less sanguine.  
Addison and Belfield (2001), for example, find no significant relationship between PRP and 
productivity performance in the private sector, while Marsden, French, and Kubo’s (2001) 
study of the public sector concludes that, in the long term, PRP may actually have a negative 
impact on organizational performance.  As regards the hypothetical association between PRP 
and pay inequality, the literature offers no direct answers. 
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4. Evidence from WERS 
 
The data used in this study are drawn from the cross-section and panel (1990-1998) elements 
of the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), a large-scale interview-based 
study providing a rich array of information at the workplace level (see Forth and Kirby 2000 
for details).  Both surveys are designed to be representative of the national economy with the 
aid of weights, which we use here, with the qualification that the cross-section data are 
limited to workplaces with ten employees or more, and the panel data to those with 25 or 
more.  Although there is no overlap between the two samples, the questions are very similar 
over a broad range, enabling analyses of the same type to be performed on both data sets. 
We are concerned with two dependent variables in the course of our tests:  workplace 
financial performance and intra-workplace pay inequality (Table 2).  We choose the former 
ahead of the alternatives of productivity and quality performance on the grounds that the 
financial measure is the ultimate arbiter of organizational effectiveness in a capitalist 
economy:  if PRP is genuinely to improve performance outcomes, it must do so at the level of 
ends rather than of means.  Consequently, we restrict the samples of both data sets to private-
sector workplaces, as we remain unconvinced tha t the (implicitly competitive) measure of 
financial performance in WERS can be accurately applied to the public sector.  The question 
itself asks management to compare the performance of its workplace to that of industry 
competitors and to rate it on a subjective scale of 1-5, ranging from “a lot better than 
average” to “a lot worse than average”.  While this format is at first glance less trustworthy 
than equivalent continuous data would be, it has the advantage of avoiding the drawbacks 
associated with accounting measures, and has been tested and endorsed elsewhere (Machin 
and Stewart 1996).  On the positive side, a clear advantage of using this measure is that, 
because the point of reference for the respondent is that of “other establishments in the same 
industry”, the question underlying the variable implicitly controls for many industry and 
market factors. 
Our chosen measure of inequality is the log of the 75:25 ratio for full-time employees 
of the organization.  This statistic suffers from two weaknesses; the first being that of its 
restricted coverage (excluding part-time workers), and the second being that it is computed 
from banded rather than continuous pay data and according to a strong assumption about the 
distribution of workers within pay bands, with the result that it tends to homogenize results at 
the workplace level and therefore underestimates variation across workplaces.  What it loses 
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in subtlety, though, it gains by maximizing the number of establishments in the sample.  The 
wide intervals of the pay bands used in the survey often lead to the clustering of the 
employees of any given workplace within only one or two pay bands, which would prevent 
any meaningful calculation of inequality if it were assumed that all employees in each band 
earned at the same level.  However, the manner in which we calculate the 75:25 ratio enables 
us still to include such establishments in the sample instead of rejecting them as insufficiently 
informative.  Despite caveats, therefore, we believe that the measure offers a useful estimate 
of the level of inequality present in within the core workforce of an establishment and is 
robust to the influence of unrepresentative individuals in the tails of the workplace 
distribution. 
Our most important independent variable relates to the usage of PRP in a given 
workplace, in which PRP corresponds to our notion of pay that is directly linked to worker 
performance (Table 2).  This variable does not relate solely to the narrow case of traditional 
piece rates, though, as measures of performance are diverse in their form in the contemporary 
economy.  Rather, it encompasses all types of performance-based pay systems, be they the 
simple “per widget” rates of artisanal production or the sophisticated schemes of the 
knowledge economy in which workers are rewarded for their achievement of previously 
negotiated goals.  The important element that these various types of pay system have in 
common is that of measurable performance targets, be they determined by physical reality 
(e.g., number of artefacts produced in a given period of time) or by human abstraction (e.g., 
project x to be completed for client y by date z). 
 It is instructive at this point to turn to preliminary results from the WERS cross-
section data, as they both corroborate a number of the results reported in the literature and 
help to frame the argument of the paper.  First, in the case of financial performance 
outcomes, workplaces that use PRP systems on average outperform those that do not (Table 
3).  This result is significant and the difference between the two averages is equivalent to 
nearly one third of the standard deviation of financial performance across the entire sample, a 
non-negligible amount.  While we include no external controls at this preliminary stage, it 
should be noted that the chosen performance measure—workplace financial performance 
relative to that of other establishments in the same industry—implicitly accounts for much of 
the variation among observations.  These data are therefore consistent with the argument that 
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PRP has a real and positive effect on organizational performance.4  Certainly, they indicate 
that the relationship between financial performance and use (or non-use) of PRP is one 
worthy of further exploration.  Second, the presence of PRP systems in a workplace is 
associated with greater levels of pay inequality (Table 4).  This result also is significant and 
of a non-negligible magnitude (equal to approximately one quarter of the standard deviation 
of the sample).  Here too, the outcome is in accordance with the predictions and findings of a 
strand of the existing literature.  In addition, it reinforces our suspicion that PRP, 
organizational performance, and inequality interact with one another in ways that have 
tangible consequences. 
 
 
5. Hypotheses 
 
5.1 Match and mismatch 
 
The evidence presented in the previous section points towards an association between the use 
of PRP on the one hand and higher levels of organizational performance and intra-
establishment pay inequality on the other.  This association is, up to a point, broadly in 
alignment with the predictions of NEP theory.  However, as we have discussed above, a close 
reading of the NEP literature underscores the importance of monitoring environments—
bundles of variables that describe the relative effectiveness of performance monitoring—as a 
mediating factor in these interrelationships.  We argue that such environments are functions 
of the production regimes in which they are embedded, as it is the nature of the production 
process in a given workplace that defines the relative feasibility of effective performance 
monitoring.  For example, let us compare the monitoring environment found in an apparel-
making facility with that of a management consultancy office.  In the former case, 
performance measurement is both cheap and easy, as management has only to count discrete 
finished products (items of clothing).  Furthermore, assuming that each worker has his or her 
own sewing machine and workstation and that the facility takes the form of a single large 
space, a very small number of managers can accurately match workers to their performance.  
Under such an ideal-typical production regime, the monitoring environment is well adapted 
                                                 
4 We are unable to make a firmer assessment of the direction of causation without access to more nuanced panel 
data.  On the theoretical level, though, we are encouraged by the fact that there are few intervening variables 
that might corrupt the relation between performance incentive (i.e., PRP) and worker performance.  This 
contrasts with, say, profit-related pay, in which a great many establishment characteristics intervene between the 
incentive and worker performance (e.g., quality of capital, market conditions, etc.). 
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to the use of PRP, and we may surmise that the introduction of PRP would lead to superior 
organizational performance.  However, in the alternative case of the management consultancy 
office, the picture is very different.  Here, workers are engaged in complex, abstract tasks, the 
final shape of which may well not be fully defined in advance.  In addition, workers work 
together on some tasks, singly on others, and often work away from the office location, all of 
which poses great obstacles to the consistent and accurate monitoring, measurement, and 
attribution of performance.  In this context, with a less friendly monitoring environment, it is 
much less likely that PRP will improve performance outcomes. 
 As even these thumbnail sketches illustrate, monitoring environments are complex 
phenomena that define themselves along multiple dimensions.  However, NEP theory does 
not automatically generate a finite list of variables that would encompass the concept of the 
monitoring environment.  Consequently, we rely for its formulation on the exhaustive reading 
of the NEP-related literature performed by Fernie and Metcalf (1999) (Table 5).  This table 
enumerates all of the implications of NEP theory for the issues of worker performance 
monitoring and organizational performance that have previously been proposed.  
Collectively, these variables describe the monitoring environment of an establishment.  Given 
the interaction of the monitoring environment with pay systems that can be defined in binary 
terms (input-based or performance-based; time pay or PRP), we posit that monitoring 
environments can also be categorized along parallel lines (Figure 1).  Optimal organizational 
performance results from the “correct” combination of pay system and monitoring 
environment, and suboptimal performance stems from “incorrect” combinations.  We refer to 
these two types of combination as “matched” and “mismatched” cases respectively.  Thus, 
our first hypothesis is that matched workplaces will outperform, ceteris paribus, their 
mismatched counterparts. 
 
5.2 Learning by trial and error 
 
One could argue that if the above argument were true, there would exist no real- life examples 
of “mismatch”, as managers would ensure that their establishments’ pay systems and 
monitoring environments were in alignment.   However, as we have seen, monitoring 
environments are extremely complex phenomena defined along multiple dimensions.  It is 
therefore entirely conceivable that in many cases managers simply do not know in advance 
which pay system will obtain optimal results in combination with their establishment’s 
production regime (and, by extension, monitoring environment).  As a result we anticipate 
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that, in such cases, managers must engage in trial-and-error behaviour in order to discover 
which pay system best suits their requirements.  Our second hypothesis, then, is that 
workplace-level learning processes will manifest themselves on the collective level as a 
general tendency among establishments to gravitate towards a matched combination of pay 
system and monitoring environment. 
 
 
6. Testing the Hypotheses 
 
6.1 Model 
 
The principle challenge for our analysis is to differentiate between matched and mismatched 
combinations of pay system and monitoring environment.  We approach this problem by 
predicting which establishments “ought” to use PRP and which “ought not” (and should 
therefore use an input-based pay system).  We then combine these predicted results with 
current data on pay system usage in order to categorize establishments according to the rubric 
of match or mismatch. 
Our predictive method is to use a logit equation to regress the indicator variable for 
the use of PRP on a set of independent variables that collectively describe the monitoring 
environment of the workplace (Table 5).  While we are unable to find adequate measures in 
WERS (either cross-section or panel data) for every one of the variables proposed by Fernie 
and Metcalf, we succeed in the great majority of cases, including the most important ones 
that relate to the costs of measurement of input and performance.  As a result we are 
confident that the resultant group of independent variables captures the bulk of variation 
among types of monitoring environment.  Having run the equation on the data, we divide the 
sample into those that ought and those that ought not to use PRP according to their predicted 
probability statistic.  We use a cut-off point of 0.5:  establishments with a probability statistic 
equal to or greater than this value are placed in the “ought” category, all others in the “ought 
not” category.  When this binary classification is combined with current data on pay usage, it 
results in the fourfold categorization shown in Figure 1, with matched cases featured in the 
upper- left and lower-right quadrants, and mismatched cases along the other diagonal. 
This system of classification is applied to both the cross-section and panel data (both 
periods) in order to facilitate the testing of the concepts of match/mismatch and trial-and-
error learning.  Due to the substantial overlap in terms of featured questions between the two 
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questionnaires, the respective models are largely identical.  The model used on the panel data 
is, however, simpler than its cross-section counterpart, as the former questionnaire is less 
extensive in the areas of job organization and external market environments (see Table 5). 
 
6.2 Classification by match and mismatch 
 
The application of the above method of classification to WERS 98 cross-section data reveals 
that approximately 20% of the weighted sample currently uses PRP (Table 6).  This figure 
may be contrasted with the model’s prediction that only 16% of establishments ought to be 
employing such a pay system.  However, there is little overlap between these two groups, as 
only 3% of the sample is categorized as both currently using PRP and having a suitably 
matched monitoring environment.5  Given that 66% of establishments are classed as matched 
cases that do not (and ought not to) use PRP, the model therefore indicates that nearly a third 
of establishments currently suffer from mismatch between their pay system type and 
monitoring environment.  This result suggests that a large part of the sample could improve 
its level of organizational performance by modifying its compensation system. 
 
6.3 Financial performance outcomes 
 
Subsample means of financial performance are computed for each of the quadrant-groups 
displayed in Table 6.  The results suggest that the relationship between pay system and 
monitoring environment exerts a significant influence on the performance of organizations:  
matched cases on average outperform mismatched cases within each pay system type (Table 
7).  This is to say that, of the establishments that do not use PRP, those whose monitoring 
environment fits the use of input-based pay, are the superior performers.  And of the 
workplaces that do use PRP, those with the matched variety of monitoring environment 
outperform those that do not. 
 This claim, however, does not obscure the fact that these results reinforce a 
conclusion reached early in the analysis, that establishments that use PRP on average 
outperform those that do not, regardless of the monitoring environments they use and of their 
match/mismatch status (Table 3).  Due to limitations in the data, though, our analysis is 
                                                 
5 Note that in Tables 6, 7, and 9, the white quadrants denote cases in which pay system and monitoring 
environment are matched, whereas the shaded quadrants denote cases in which they are mismatched. 
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unable to control for certain influences that might drive this overall pattern, such as 
workforce composition or market structure. 
Interestingly, the match/mismatch distinction exerts no independent influence on pay 
inequality.  It remains the case that establishments using PRP have more unequal pay 
structures than those that do not (see Table 4), and our tests fail to discern any difference in 
inequality between the matched and mismatched subgroups of the broader categories of PRP 
users and non-PRP users.  This result supports the view that there exists a trade-off in the use 
of PRP that pits performance against inequality, and that the trade-off may well not be worth 
it in cases in which pay system and monitoring environment are not aligned. 
 
6.4 Experimentation with pay systems  
 
The above static analysis indicates that a sizeable proportion of establishments does not use 
the pay system that would produce optimum performance outcomes in combination with its 
production regime (and, by extension, its monitoring environment).  Using panel data for 
1990 and 1998, we repeat our method of classification for both periods in order to introduce a 
dynamic element into our study.  Table 8 displays the results of this analysis, tabulating the 
use of PRP in 1990 with that in 1998.  There is evidence of considerable flux among 
workplaces in the use of pay systems:  only 42% of the weighted sample are reported as using 
PRP in 1990, compared to 57% in 1998.6  This general increase in the coverage of PRP 
masks a degree of churning, though, as 11% of establishments actually ceased using PRP 
during the period 1990-1998, compared to the 26% that acquired such a pay system.  On the 
whole, these results suggest that managers engage in widespread experimentation with 
different types of pay system.  The next section probes for an underlying pattern to these 
movements. 
 
6.5 “Correct” and “incorrect” managerial decisions  
 
There are two reasons for which a matched combination of pay system and monitoring 
environment might become mismatched, and vice versa.  First of all, the establishment might 
                                                 
6 Caveat:  in the cross-section data for 1998, the proportion of workplaces using PRP is only 21% (Table 6), 
compared to the value of 57% in the panel data.  This difference can be substantially explained by the facts that 
the cross-section sample covers establishments of 10 or more employees and above, whereas the panel sample’s 
lower limit is 25 employees, and that the two sample structures differ, as the panel sample has a much greater 
mean and standard deviation of establishment size.  As the use of PRP is correlated with establishment size, it 
follows that a greater proportion of the panel sample is recorded as using PRP. 
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undergo an organizational upheaval—internally or externally imposed—that results in a 
change of production regime and, consequently, of monitoring environment type.  
Alternatively, management might modify the compensation system in the hope of obtaining 
improved performance.  In either scenario, match becomes mismatch, or the other way 
around. 
 We hypothesized above that, in the case of this second variety of change, managers 
would appraise performance under the new compensation system, learn from the experience, 
and then decide whether to stick with the new pay structure (i.e., the change resulted in 
improved performance) or to revert to the previous kind (i.e., the change resulted in 
diminished performance).  We referred to this process as learning by trial and error, 
conjecturing that over time it would lead to an increasing proportion of establishment’s 
adopting the matched set of pay system and monitoring environment.  However, this 
assumption must be qualified, as the existence of any such process relies on managers’ 
readiness to experiment.  Where there is no experimentation, there can be no learning. 
 We test for the effect of experimentation on learning by examining management 
decisions about compensation systems.  Using the findings from the panel data regarding 
match and mismatch of pay and monitoring in 1990 and 1998, we classify decisions about 
compensation made during this period as either “correct” or “incorrect”.  Correct decisions 
are those to retain or move to a matched combination of pay and monitoring systems; 
incorrect systems are those to keep or move to the opposite.  We control for the effect of 
changes in the production regime by removing from the sample those establishments whose 
monitoring environment—according to the prediction of the model—changes during the 
period 1990-1998.  Any changes in the pay systems of the observations that remain, 
therefore, must be due to managerial choice.  Our results indicate that managers who have 
experience of matched pay systems and monitoring environments (and the performance gains 
they bring) are significantly more likely to make correct decisions in the subsequent period 
about which pay system to employ:  whereas 72% of establishment managements that have a 
matched combination of pay and monitoring systems in the first period subsequently make 
the correct decision, only 48% of those that do not also make the correct decision (Table 9).  
It may be surmised, therefore, that managers do learn from their experimentation with pay 
systems. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This paper addresses the relationship between PRP and organizational performance, about the 
form of which there is considerable disagreement.  In doing so, it uncovers evidence that this 
relationship is strongly mediated by a multidimensional factor that we refer to as an 
establishment’s monitoring environment.  Principally, this factor pertains to managers’ ability 
to measure worker performance within the constraints of the production regime of their 
workplace.  Thus, it is not so much the choice of pay system that drives organizational 
performance outcomes, but the combination of pay system and monitoring environment:  
“matched” combinations outperform their “mismatched” counterparts. 
 This result obtains most strongly in the class of establishments that use PRP, despite 
the fact that the use of PRP is associated with higher intra-workplace inequality.  Other 
studies have suggested that higher inequality is negatively associated with organizational 
performance, but our results indicate that, even if this is the case, any negative effect is 
overpowered by the positive incentive effect provided by the pay structure. 
 By extending our analysis to panel data, we discover evidence for the existence of a 
trial-and-error learning process among managers with regard to their choice of pay system.  
This result suggests that managers are aware that there is no universally superior type of pay 
system, and that they must take into account their pay system’s interaction with workplace-
specific factors in the search for optimal organizational performance.  It also appears that it is 
because managers realize that these factors are too complex for the answer to be apparent ex 
ante that they actively engage in experimentation. 
 Lastly, it must be noted that, while the conclusions of our study are aligned with our 
theoretical predictions, we are unable to be certain of the direction of the arrow of causation 
between the combination of pay system/monitoring environment and organizational 
performance.  However, our findings are highly consistent with the notion that it is the former 
driving the latter, and the absence of possible mediating variables also provides reason to 
think that we are on relatively firm ground in our conclusions.  To be absolutely certain of 
our findings would require access to a more sophisticated panel data set. 
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Table 1:  Use of different types of PBR in the UK (public and private sectors) 
 Percentage responses 
 Yes No 
Management employees   
Individual PRP 40 60 
Team-based PRP 8 92 
Skill- or competency-based pay 6 94 
Profit-related pay 35 65 
Employee share ownership scheme 17 83 
Non-management employees   
Individual PRP 25 75 
Team-based PRP 8 92 
Skill- or competency-based pay 11 89 
Profit-related pay 34 66 
Employee share ownership scheme 15 85 
Source:  Performance pay trends in the UK, IPD survey report, September 1999 
 
Table 2:  Summary of key variables 
Variable Definition Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Financial 
performance 
Subjective 
ranking of 
performance 
relative to 
industry 
competitors 
1171 3.707088 0.865547 1 5 
Pay 
inequality 
Log of 
75:25 ratio 
for full-time 
workforce 
1323 1.047959 0.02025 1.006919 1.138644 
Use of PRP 
Usage of 
pay linked 
directly to 
worker 
performance 
1323 0.278156 0.44826 0 1 
 
Table 3:  PRP and financial performance 
Use of performance 
pay system 
Establishment 
financial 
performance 
(standard error) 
% of across-sample 
standard deviation of 
financial 
performance 
Yes 
3.88 
(0.07)  
No 
3.60 
(0.05)  
Difference 0.27* 31.9% 
* Significant at the 1% level 
Source:  WERS 98 cross-section data 
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Table 4:  PRP and intra-workplace pay inequality 
Use of performance 
pay system 
Intra-workplace pay 
inequality (standard 
error) 
% of across-sample 
standard deviation of 
pay inequality 
Yes 
1.052 
(0.003)  
No 
1.047 
(0.001)  
Difference 0.005* 24.6% 
* Significant at the 10% level 
Source:  WERS 98 cross-section data 
 
Table 5:  Monitoring environments (Based on Table 1, Fernie and Metcalf 1998) 
Pay by PRP 
system if… 
Characteristic Pay by basic if… 
Measure or proxy 
available in 
WERS98 cross-
section? 
Measure or proxy 
available in 
WERS90-98 
panel? 
Measuring output, monitoring input, and nature of the job: 
Low Output 
measurement costs  
High Y Y 
High Cost of monitoring 
input/effort 
Low Y Y 
Low 
Supervision 
intensity, 
programmability 
High Y Y 
High Span of control Low N N 
Large Workgroup size Small Y Y 
Repetitive Job task Wide range Y N 
Unimportant Team production Important Y N 
High Labour intensity Low Y Y 
Role of technical change: 
No (i).  If technical 
change is rapid 
Yes Y N 
Yes 
(ii).  Whether 
technical change is 
skill-biased 
No N N 
Labour market and product market: 
High 
Worker 
heterogeneity (of 
ability) 
Low N N 
High Wage in alternative 
firm 
Low Y N 
High Elasticity of effort 
wrt wage 
Low N N 
Low Risk aversion 
(worker) 
High N N 
No  Union recognition Yes Y Y 
Short Tenure Long Y Y 
Few No. of occupations Many Y Y 
Low Cost of monitoring 
quality of output 
High Y N 
High Competition Low Y N 
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Table 6:  Classification by match and mismatch 
Weighted sample 
proportions (%) 
Whether establishment "ought" to use 
PRP 
Current use of PRP 
system 
Yes No Total 
Yes 3 18 21 
No 13 66 79 
Total 16 84 100 
Source:  WERS 98 cross-section data 
 
Table 7:  Financial performance outcomes 
Mean establishment financial 
performance 
(standard error) 
Establishment’s monitoring 
environment is suited to PRP 
Establishment uses PRP 
system 
Yes No 
Yes 
4.11* 
(0.11) 
3.84* 
(0.08) 
No 
3.38* 
(0.12) 
3.65* 
(0.06) 
* These values are all significantly different from one another at the 
10% level or better 
Source:  WERS 98 cross-section data 
 
Table 8:  Experimentation with pay systems  
Weighted sample 
proportions (%) 
Use of PRP system in 1998 
Use of PRP system in 
1990 
Yes No Total 
Yes 31 11 42 
No 26 32 58 
Total 57 43 100 
Source:  WERS 98 panel data 
 
Table 9:  Managerial decision making and learning 
Column proportions (%) Matched combination of pay system 
and monitoring environment in 1990 
Correct subsequent decision 
regarding pay system 
Yes No 
Yes 72* 48* 
No 28* 52* 
Totals 100 100 
* These values are significantly different from one another at the 1% 
level or better 
Source:  WERS 98 panel data 
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Figure 1:  Predicted organizational performance by combinations of pay system and 
monitoring environment 
 Monitoring environment 
Pay system Cheap, accurate Expensive, inaccurate 
Performance-based Optimal Suboptimal 
Input-based Suboptimal Optimal 
 
Figure 2:  % of employees receiving some form of PBR (Source:  NES)7 
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Figure 3:  PBR as % Average Gross Earnings (Source:  NES)8 
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7 Note:  missing observations denote years for which data could not be found. 
8 Note:  missing observations denote years for which data could not be found. 
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